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Abstract: Our article addresses the following research question: how 
does a polycentric view refine our understanding of interconnections 
between coordination practices and macro-arrangements in extreme 
action teams? It examines coordination between French pre-hospital 
emergency teams. It reveals three main coordination practices and 
disclose how macro-arrangements provide teams with a permanent 
template for coordinating in turbulent situations.  
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Résumé : Cet article pose la question de recherche suivante : comment 
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équipes extrêmes ? Il analyse la coordination entre des équipes 
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arreglos en los equipos de acción extrema? El examina la coordinación 
entre los equipos de emergencia prehospitalarios franceses. Revela tres 
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proporcionan a los equipos una plantilla permanente para coordinar en 
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While coordination has been a central topic in research for years, our 
understanding is still messy and fragmented (Okhuysen and Bechky, 
2009). That drove scholars to further investigate coordination within a 
practice-based view to examine the emergent and situated nature of 
coordination (e.g. Faraj and Xiao, 2006; Bechky, 2006; Jarzabkowski 
et al., 2012; Harrison and Rouse, 2014; Wolbers et al., 2018). These 
more recent studies define coordination as a “temporally unfolding and 
contextualized process of input regulation and interaction articulation 
to realize a collective performance” (Faraj and Xiao, 2006, p. 1157).  
Among these practice-based contributions, many investigate extreme 
action teams, defined as “highly skilled members [who] cooperate to 
perform urgent, unpredictable, interdependent and highly 
consequential tasks while simultaneously coping with frequent change 
in team’s composition and training their team’s novices members” 
(Klein et al., 2006, p. 590). For instance, authors investigate 
coordination practices in police forces (Schakel et al., 2016), military 
squadrons (Godé and Lebraty, 2015), emergency response groups 
(Majchrzak et al., 2007; Wolbers et al., 2018), or emergency trauma 
centre teams (Faraj and Xiao, 2006). While all teams in organizations 
need effective coordination to perform, extreme action teams more 
frequently deal with uncertainty and hence possibly require proper 
coordination practices for encountering unexpected situations and 
enabling adaptation (Godé, 2015; Bouty et al., 2011). In investigating 
extreme action teams, coordination-as-practice contributions make 
coordination transparently observable (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 
64), and provide a rich body of updated knowledge regarding the way 
it is is daily developed and practiced. 
Although significant advances, this fruitful body of research partially 
addresses the question of micro-macro connections on coordination 
practices. As extreme teams are used to work “within a larger 
institutional network of organizations, communities, and individuals” 
(Majchrzak et al., 2007, p. 159), more studies are needed to capture the 
complex and imbricated organizational contexts these teams handle to 
perform. Adopting a polycentric view of coordination, our article aims 
to address this gap by analysing the interconnections between 
coordination practices developed by extreme teams and macro-
arrangements they daily deal with.  
Defined as “many centres of decision making that are formally 
independent of each other [and, meanwhile] take each other into 
account in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and 
cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to 
resolve conflicts” (Ostrom et al., 1961, pp. 831-2), the concept of 
polycentricity directs attention to the examination of micro- interactions 
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in broader field settings, taking into consideration multitype and 
multilevel arrangements. In this article, we suggest that the concept of 
polycentricity may allow grasping the micro-macro arrangements of 
coordination, as it exposes processes and issues that may remain hidden 
with a single micro-level analysis.  
This prompts the following research question: How does a polycentric 
view refine our understanding of interconnections between 
coordination practices and macro-arrangements in extreme action 
teams? To address our question, we conducted an ethnomethodology 
research to examine these complex issues in real-life setting. Our 
qualitative study involves different French Pre-Hospital Emergency 
(PHE) teams. PHE teams consist of multiple rescue teams which work 
under time-speed pressures and regularly face with unexpected 
situations. They must coordinate with each other in polycentric settings, 
as they report to different decision centres and may implement different 
rules, procedures and material conditions into practices.  
Our analysis demonstrates that polycentricity is a relevant approach to 
delve into the interconnections between macro-arrangements and 
teamwork practices when extreme teams coordinate. It first allows 
revealing three main coordination practices – anticipation, negotiation 
and consensus – developed by extreme teams as they coordinate. It also 
helps to disclose how macro-arrangements provide extreme teams with 
a permanent template for coordinating, enable them to both structure 
teamwork and dynamically adjust to situated situations and unexpected 
events. Finally, our findings suggest some leads for practice, as a 
polycentric view of coordination offers potential for improving 
performance both for PHE teams and traditional teams in organisational 
settings. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follow: the first section 
reviews practice-based contributions on coordination within and 
between extreme action teams and presents the concept of 
polycentricity. The second section exposes the research setting, the 
ethnomethodology research we adopted, and describes two different 
action situations involving French PHE teams. The third section finally 
analyses our findings and discusses theoretical contributions and 
practical insights for organisations.  
Conceptual framing 
Coordination practices in extreme action teams 
Practices are “routinized type of behavior which consists of several 
elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms 
of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in 
the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and 
motivational knowledge” (Reckwitz, 2002, pp. 49-50). They are the 
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manner of working to achieve a task (Bourdieu, 1980), emerging from 
“an ongoing stream of activities and enact[ing] through the 
contextualized actions of individuals” (Faraj and Xiao, 2006, p. 1157). 
Practice-based theory directs attention to what people do in their 
everyday and situated organizing. Embracing this focus, coordination-
as-practices research provide micro-level insights by exploring how 
coordination is concretely enacted by actors through their dynamic 
social activities (Jarzabkowski et al., 2012). Coordination is an 
emergent and situated phenomena, unfolding in specific times and 
spaces, and resulting of particular conditions during which actors 
interact to achieve collective outcomes.  
Given the features of practices, Nicolini, Gherardi and Yanow (2003) 
argue that they are “better observed when some “breakdown” occurs in 
[…] entrenched practice[s] or when some substantial change requires 
major realignments of the extant configuration of practice[s]” (p. 28). 
Many coordination-as-practice contributions answer the authors’ call in 
examining practices when coordination is performed by extreme action 
teams (e.g. Wolbers et al., 2018; Schakel et al., 2016; Majchrzak et al., 
2007; Faraj and Xiao, 2006). Authors delve deeper into the complexity 
of coordination in investigating how these teams generate multiple 
practices to accomplish a task and respond quickly to unexpected turns 
of events.  
For example, analysing how medical teams coordinate in a US Trauma 
Centre, Faraj and Xiao (2006) demonstrate that coordination is based 
on expertise and dialogic practices. Expertise practices ensure expertise 
integration and flexible teamwork. Dialogic practices, for their part, 
operates to guarantee timely and situated responses to unexpected 
events. The authors especially emphasize that, when faced with 
uncertainty, organisations must create room for dialogic coordination 
practices, through which actors build sense-making and challenge 
protocols. In a close spirit, Godé and Lebraty (2015) investigate 
experience feedback as a way to foster team coordination and 
adaptation facing the unexpected. Building on the case of an aerobatic 
military team, the authors demonstrate that experience feedback 
improves coordination in promoting the articulation of three 
coordination practices: communication, socialization and reflexivity. 
More recently, Schakel, Van Fenema and Faraj (2016) examine the 
challenge posed by unexpected switching between practices in fast-
response organisations. Relying on multiple specialized police teams 
handling a Dutch National Police operation, they state that fast-
response teams experience some difficulties to switch from a practice 
(surveillance) to another (apprehension) as they are already committed 
(in terms of roles, routines, collective sense-making, material 
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arrangements and field conditions) to a specific practice. Finally, the 
latest Wolbers, Boersma and Groenewegen article (2018) analyses 
coordination practices developed during emergency response 
operations by a team consisting of fire department, medical services, 
and police officers. The authors found that, confronting to turbulent 
situations, these officers use three interrelated practices: working 
around procedures, delegating tasks, and demarcating expertise. In 
creating fragmentation rather integration, these coordination practices 
support flexibility, improvisation and ad-hoc responses required to 
handle the unforeseen. 
Altogether, these contributions approach coordination as bundles of 
practices. The authors demonstrate that extreme action teams develop 
manifold situated coordination practices regarding the specific 
circumstances they handle (Bouty et al., 2011). The authors also 
describe the complex and imbricated nature of organizational settings 
extreme teams are involved in (e.g. multiple specialized police teams in 
the Schakel et al.’s article; fire department, medical services, and police 
officers in the Wolbers et al.’s article). However, they do not go deeper 
into the comprehension of these broader field settings. While they 
notice the connections between macro-arrangements and coordination 
practices, they tend to overlook this question in their findings. For 
example, Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa and Hollingshead (2007) argue that 
members from emergency response teams approach situations to handle 
from specific social, institutional and organisational rules, which may 
be different from one participant to another. Authors assume that these 
diversities “may affect not only trust [among emergency response team 
members], but the speed of forming groups, role negotiation, and 
interaction patterns” (p. 159). However, they do not go further to 
examine these impacts on coordination. Another example is provided 
by Godé and Lebraty (2015) who highlight that, beyond their dedicated 
aerobatic missions, team members are tightly engaged in military 
duties, attitudes and cultural values. The aerobatic military team also 
deals with the Fédération Aéronautique International (FAI) – in charge 
of publishing competition rules and procedures, organizing national and 
international Championships, etc. – and private sponsors which fund a 
part of their communication activities. These multiple networks and 
partners create an intricately macro-context which is underplayed by 
the authors in their study of coordination practices. A last example can 
be found in the Schakel, Van Fenema and Faraj (2016)’s contribution. 
The authors report a Police operation imbricated into a complex 
institutional and physical environment of which disconnections may 
challenge the coordination practices switching. They describe a 
multidisciplinary Police operation which involves several Police units 
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and specialists, reporting to three different teams (visual, technical, and 
helicopter). The article also mentions the role played by the Police 
chief, the National Police Agency and the Dutch Parliament after the 
police operation failure. However, while acknowledging that 
institutional disconnects have laid to underperforming outcomes, the 
authors do not question these macro-arrangements complexities on 
coordination practices.  
In this article, we suggest that the polycentric perspective is an 
appropriated way to refine our understanding of the interconnections 
between micro and macro-arrangements extreme action teams daily 
deal with in their continuous efforts of coordination. 
The concept of polycentricity 
The concept of polycentricity can be defined as “a structural feature of 
social systems of many decision centers having limited and autonomous 
prerogatives and operating under an overarching set of rules” (Aligica 
and Tarko, 2012, p. 237). Polanyi (1951) was the first to develop the 
contour of this concept. The author was interested in social 
organizations (e.g. scientific communities, the market, etc.) where 
actors interact freely within a general system of rules and norms. 
Drawing on Polanyi, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom (e.g. Ostrom et al., 
1961; Ostrom, 2005) offer the full import of the concept of 
polycentricity, providing a complete theoretical development linked to 
empirical substance. They consider polycentricity as a complex form of 
governance, with overlapping centers of decision operating with some 
degree of autonomy. As argue by Ostrom (2010), polycentric settings 
are “multiple governing authorities at differing scales […]. Each unit 
within exercises considerable independence to make norms and rules 
within a specific domain” (Ostrom, 2010, p. 552).  
As such, the concept of polycentricity allows analysing an interwoven 
system of power, decision-makings, rules and material conditions that 
gathers different individual and collective actions, in complex 
multilevel interdependent relationships (Aligica and Tarko, 2012). In a 
polycentric setting, teams belong to formally different decision 
structures and follow an overarching system of rules, procedures and 
norms. They are collectively involved in diverse ways of providing 
outcomes and achieving joint actions.  
Consequently, as Ostrom shows, the concept of polycentricity allows 
building a complex theoretical view – instead of a “dichotomous world 
of the market and the state” (Ostrom, 2009, p. 408) – to explain the 
puzzling of interactions and problem-solving teams are involved in. As 
she claimed during her Nobel Prize Lecture: “the humans […] have 
complex motivational structures and establish diverse private-for-
profit, governmental, and community institutional arrangements that 
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operate at multiple scales” (Ostrom, 2009, p. 408). She considers that 
the appropriate analytical level is the one that provides a deeper 
understanding of the multiplicity of teams and affiliations involved in 
the collective process of working and producing outputs.  
For example, examining the impact of governance arrangements for 
policing within 80 U.S. metropolitan areas, Ostrom and her-co-authors 
(e.g., Ostrom, 1972; Ostrom and Whitaker, 1973, Ostrom et al., 1978) 
study a series of case comparisons of Police departments to assess the 
performance of direct (e.g. patrols, traffic control, investigations) and 
intermediate (e.g. criminal laboratory facilities, communication 
dispatching) services to citizen. Digging into the practices through 
which police forces deliver these services on the ground, the authors 
demonstrate that “metropolitan areas with large numbers of 
autonomous direct service producers achieve higher level of efficiency. 
Efficiency was also enhanced in those metropolitan areas with a small 
number of producers providing indirect services” (Ostrom and Ostrom, 
2014, p. 171). Ostrom’s and colleagues research reveals that polycentric 
settings are efficiently governed through a wide diversity of micro and 
macro-arrangements, which make extreme actions teams (such as 
police teams they study) resilient and reactive.  
The concept of polycentricity offers a fruitful perspective to explore the 
interconnections between micro and macro-arrangements in extreme 
action team coordination. Coordination practices cannot be examined 
in isolation as they are always immersed in complex texture of 
interconnections (Nicolini, 2009). Their analysis both requires a focus 
on local practices developed by actors and an appreciation of their 
connections to broader field settings such as organizational rules, norms 
and procedures. In this article, we suggest that the concept of 
polycentricity opens a new space to examine coordination practices 
when extreme action teams are engaged in the same collective outcome 
while they report to different decision-making centres and follow an 
overarching system of rules.  
Research setting and methods 
Our empirical study is based on a research agreement between one of 
the authors university and the “Manche” Fire Rescue Department 
(FRD). The “Manche” FRD handles multiple emergency interventions, 
from sea rescue operations (the connection between North Sea and 
Atlantic Ocean leads to a severe maritime traffic) to people assistance. 
In this article, we investigate a specific type of extreme teams, called 
Pre-Hospital Emergency (PHE) teams, for which the “Manche” FRD 
takes part in its constitution. PHE teams cover a wide range of 
paramedical and medical operations. Their aim is to provide victims 
with an urgent and unscheduled care provision outside of the hospital, 
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from minor injury to life threatening injury. PHE teams are engaged in 
care-giving both on-scene and in-transit to the hospital. They consist of 
a body of diverse prehospital practitioners, who are temporarily put 
together by emergency dispatchers. When a victim calls for a rescue 
(the French emergency phone numbers are 15, 18 and 112), the 
dispatcher identifies the injury level, asks for a distant first diagnosis to 
a regulation doctor when necessary (in order to advance PHE team 
interventions) and deploys appropriated resources (composition of PHE 
teams and transportation means). From first-aiding to medical 
competences, PHE teams consist of diverse prehospital expertise that 
get together to achieve an emergency care provision operation (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1. The Pre-Hospital Emergency (PHE) teams 
 
Our empirical investigation is based on the interpretative framework of 
ethnomethodology. Garfinkel (1967) introduces ethnomethodology as 
a way to focus on action and doing, in describing how actors “produce 
and manage settings of organized everyday affairs” (Garfinkel 1967, p. 
1). As the author insists on, it is crucial to analyse both the situated 
actions of people and the sequence of these situated actions to 
understand how practices emerge from daily activities and, in turn, 
generate and reproduce the social order. Ethnomethodology directs our 
analytical focus on practical activities and circumstances in which 
macro-arrangements are rendered visible and put into practice when 
extreme teams coordinate. It helps us to study how extreme teams 
understand and create the social order (here, coordination) when they 
perform under uncertainty and time pressure. Consequently, one way to 
answer our research question – How does a polycentric view refine our 
understanding of interconnections between coordination practices and 
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macro-arrangements in extreme action teams? – is to conduct an 
ethnomethodological research (Horvath and Datry, 2013). 
Data collection primarily relies on participant observations, enabling to 
get close to action situations. An action situation refers to situation in 
which two or more actors select actions, engage in patterns of 
interaction, and realize collective outcomes from their interactions. 
From July 1 to October 15, 2016, we observed 18 pre-hospital action 
situations with a maximum variation in terms of: distance from the 
closest relevant hospital, team composition (professionals and/or 
volunteers), actors from different centres of decision, night and day 
operations, localizations, week, week-end and holidays interventions, 
national and local social events, different kind of medical emergency 
(see Table 1).  
For each action situation, one of the authors of this article was 
embedded in a rescue team vehicle, observing coordination “on action 
and doing” during real-life emergency operations. She was particularly 
alert to all coordination challenges she could observe, with a special 
focus on coordination practices and macro-arrangements (rules, norms, 
procedures, core values, and material conditions) put into practice by 
actors. She closely examined what people actually did when they 
coordinated, keeping and up-dating a field-diary day after day. Finally, 
she collected procedures used by teams, gathered the notes they wrote 
during and after operations, and transcribed radio communications 
between them.  
 
Table 1. Collected action situations 
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Action situation Date (2016) Intervention Actors on scene Coordination challenges  
and unexpected events 
N°1. Saint Lô Saint 
George  
07/01, 08.39 am Epigastric discomfort - at home 1 dispatcher, 1 regulation doctor, 3 
firefighters (1 professional and 2 first-
aider volunteers) 
Unclear emergency localisation 
N°2. Saint Lô [1] 07/01, 01.25 pm Old man accidental fall - at home 1 dispatcher, 1 regulation doctor, 3 
professional firefighters 
Ambiguity on a specific protocol and a convention with 
private ambulances 
N°3. Couvains 07/01, 04.47 pm 4 serious casualties due to two-
vehicle accidents - public road 
1 dispatcher, 1 regulation doctor, 2 police 
officers, 3 professional firefighters, 1 team 
leader firefighter and 2 firefighters 
specialized at auto-extrication 
Unclear first distant diagnosis, teams involved outside 
their regular sector 
N°4. Utah Beach 07/02, 05.19 pm Collapse and fall of a Tour de 
France spectator - public road 
Operational headquarter (prefecture 
representatives and the FRD director), 
FRD tactical headquarter (including 1 
head doctor, 1 emergency operation 
commander, firefighters), 3 civil 
protection first-aiders, medical and 
paramedical experts 
Unclear first diagnosis, dense crowd, problems for 
getting to the victim, many ways of transportation, 
unexpected event: arrival of the peloton, "cutting point” 
uselessness, many decision-making layers, higher rank 
decision makers involved in tactical decision, 
adjustment of basic procedures 
N°5. Cherbourg 07/03, 04.15 pm Little boy headache and vomiting 
due to an accidental fall - public 
road during the Tour de France 
Operational headquarter (prefectural, 
local, police, etc. authorities), security 
command post, professional firefighters 
(including nurses and doctors), volunteer 
firefighters (first-aiders), civil safety first-
aiders and police forces 
Dense crowd, problems for getting to the victim, many 
ways of transportation, many decision-making layers, 
higher rank decision makers involved in tactical 
decision 
N°6. Granville 07/12, 12.20 pm Suicide attempt via absorption of 
medicine - at home 
1 regulation doctor, 3 firefighters (2 
professional and 1 first-aider volunteer) 
Unclear medical background of the victim 
N°7. Chausey 07/12, 06.37 pm Shoulder and knee trauma due to 
an accidental fall - public area 
1 dispatcher, 1 regulation doctor, 2 
firefighters (first-aider volunteer) and a 
flying rescue team 
Difficult meteorological and environmental conditions, 
helicopter transportation, delicate evacuation 
N°8. Saint Jean de 
Daye 
07/27, 12.27 pm Allergic reaction after receiving a 
medication - at home 
1 dispatcher, 1 regulation doctor, 3 
firefighters (1 professional, 2 first-aider 
volunteers) and 1 firefighter nurse  
Unclear first distant diagnosis, once on site: no life 
threatening, information sharing problems between the 
nurse, firefighters and dispatcher 
N°9. Mont Saint 
Michel 
07/29, 10.22 am Attack of faintness - on the street 1 dispatcher, Mont Saint Michel security 
command post (14 first-aiders) and 3 
firefighters (2 first-aiders volunteers and 1 
nurse) 
Difficult environmental conditions, once on site: the 
situation does not require an emergency operation 
N°10. Tribehou 07/29, 02.03 pm General health deterioration of a 
hemiplegic patient - at home 
1 dispatcher, 1 regulation doctor, 1 
general practitioner, 1 home care assistant, 
3 firefighters (1 professional and 2 
volunteer first-aiders), and 1 hospital 
nurse 
Unclear first distant diagnosis, dispatcher decision 
(ambulance deficiency) questioned by firefighters, 
different languages, different protocols and norms 
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N°11. Cherbourg 
Cité de la mer 
08/03, 02.21 pm Strong back pain and loss of 
consciousness in a museum - public 
area 
1 dispatcher, 1 regulation doctor, 3 
professional firefighters and a security 
guard 
Dense crowd (many tourists on site), problems for 
getting to the victim 
N°12. Cherbourg 
Les Eleis 
08/03, 03.11 pm Cut on a little girl scalp due to an 
accidental fall at supermarket - 
public area 
1 dispatcher, 1 regulation doctor, 3 
professional firefighters and a security 
guard 
Dense crowd, difficulties to drive the ambulance near to 
the victim 
N°13. Saint Briac 08/27, 04.35 am Accidental fall in the rocks - 
bottom of a cliff 
2 dispatchers from different services, 3 
firefighters (1 professional nurse and 2 
first-aider volunteers) and a flying rescue 
team from the civil protection 
Difficult environmental conditions, problems of 
transportation, sensitive evacuation, different firefighter 
rescue departments 
N°14. Ferry 10/06, 11.36 pm Broken bone stuck in an old man 
throat while a ferry ride - at sea 
3 regulators doctors from 3 different 
services, the ferry nurse, a flying rescue 
team and 3 professional firefighters 
Helicopter transportation under specific environmental 
conditions, debate between 3 different authorities to 
establish diagnosis and medical care, lack of info. for 
hospital teams 
N°15. Condé 10/08, 01.10 pm General health deterioration - at 
home 
1 dispatcher, 1 regulation doctor, 1 private 
nurse, 2 firefighters (first-aider volunteers) 
and a support team of 3 firefighters (first-
aider volunteers)  
Many PHE teams on scene, problem of information 
sharing 
N°16. Saint Lô [2] 10/08, 02.25 pm Diabetic faintness at supermarket 
checkouts - public area 
1 dispatcher, 1 regulator doctor, 3 
firefighters (2 first-aider volunteers and a 
nurse), a security guard and a checkout 
assistant 
Dense traffic, difficulties for parking the ambulance, 
emergency (for a second patient) once on site, crowd 
around the ambulance 
N°17. Saint Lô [3] 10/14, 08.30, pm Mid-age woman faintness and 
headache on a bus bench - public 
area 
1 regulator doctor, 3 firefighters (1 
professional and 2 first-aider volunteers) 
Unclear first distant diagnosis, difficulties to gather 
appropriate medical information, psychiatric case 
N°18. Agneaux 10/14, 08.11 pm Old woman chest pain with trouble 
breathing - at home 
1 dispatcher, 1 regulator doctor, 3 
firefighters (2 professional and 1 first-
aider volunteer) 
Unclear first distant diagnosis, difficulties to gather 
appropriate medical information, emergency (for a 
second patient) once at the hospital 
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Narratives have been written for each observed action situation in order 
to provide a deep description of coordination “on action and doing”, 
and to bring out the interwoven practices and macro-arrangements 
when PHE teams achieve emergency care provision operations. 
From the 18 action situations collected, we selected two as they allow 
for cross-narratives comparisons and examination of complex issues in 
real-life setting. The first action situation (Utah Beach, Tour de France, 
action situation N°4) occurs during a famous cycling race during which 
PHE teams must handle a spectator accidental fall; the second action 
situation (Tribehou, action situation N°10) occurs in Carentan’s 
swamps where a PHE team is sent for a hemiplegic patient fast medical 
care. We selected these situations as they gather many coordination 
challenges commonly adressed by PHE teams during the other action 
situations we observed (see Table 1). Moreover, during the Utah Beach 
situation, PHE teams deal with an unforsseen event while everything 
runs smoothly during the Tribehou situation. Confronting these two 
situations was a way to observe potential differences in coordination 
processes when teams are confronted to the unexpected, and when they 
are not.  
Findings 
The Utah Beach, Tour de France action situation 
During Summer 2016, the famous Tour de France cycling race goes 
from the Mont Saint Michel to Cherbourg. Widely covered by the 
media, it is followed by hundred thousand of people set along on 
roadsides to watch cyclists go by. Regarding terrorist threats, stampedes 
and faintness risks, police forces and PHE teams (from FRD, hospital, 
civil protection, non-profit organisations, etc.) are deployed for 
preventive purposes all along the route. The main goal is to provide 
emergency support and assistance as closely as possible to potential 
victims.  
An operational headquarter is established at Cherbourg. It gathers 
higher rank decision makers from the Prefecture of the “Manche” as 
well as the FRD director. They aim at consolidating information and 
coordinating tactical headquarters. They benefit from a direct link with 
emergency dispatchers and regulator doctors (15, 18 or 112 emergency 
number). An advanced medical post, consisted of medical and 
paramedical emergency experts and firefighters, is organised near the 
operational headquarter to gather, categorise and evacuate serious 
injured victims to hospital (if needed, the nearest hospital being at 40mn 
of the cycling race localisation). The operational headquarter is 
connected by radio with tactical headquarters: FRD, police, civil 
protection, non-profit organisations are each represented by a dedicated 
tactical headquarter, established in rescue trucks. Upon request by the 
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operational headquarter, these tactical headquarters gather information 
from many emergency stations (professional and volunteer firefighters, 
volunteer first-aiders from non-profit organisations, etc.) localized on 
roadsides, coordinate first-aiders and ask for transfer to the advanced 
medical post if appropriated. Many ambulances are situated near the 
emergency stations and the advanced medical post. 
To ensure cyclists’ security and according to the race committee, 
crossing roads must be restricted, even in case of emergency. The 
operational headquarter produced a permanent emergency assistance 
map showing few “cutting points”, that is localized spots where PHE 
teams can cross the road and organise ambulances access to victims 
without disrupting the cycling race. The map is shared by operational 
and tactical headquarters. Trainings were conducted to make sure that 
every PHE actor knows the shared map coding and the exact codes and 
position of cutting points. 
July 2, 2016, 05.19 pm. An accident occurs during arrival of the peloton 
at Utah Beach. A policeman situated on the side of the cycle route is 
alerted by first-aiders who saw a person collapse in the crowd. Neither 
first-aiders nor the policeman have access to the victim. The policeman 
calls the operational headquarter, which immediately contacts the FRD 
tactical headquarter to ask for the distress exact localisation. It is easily 
found thanks to the map-code provided by the policeman. The FRD 
tactical headquarter consists of a head doctor, an emergency operations 
commander, a dispatcher and a nurse; all of them are firefighters. They 
follow their usual procedure called “graduated response”, which 
specifies that a first diagnosis must be established by first-aiders before 
planning a suitable rescue action. They take few minutes to debate about 
the most appropriate PHE team (in terms of localization and 
transportation) they must send on scene. At that time, some firefighters 
present in the rescue truck take part in the discussion: as they are used 
to work around the accident area, they know how it is hard to reach for 
a non-local ambulance driver, even with a map. Finally, an ambulance 
with civil protection first-aiders, situated near the accident, is sent. One 
of the firefighters present in the tactical headquarter truck, and familiar 
with the area, is in radio contact with the ambulance driver to provide 
him with detailed road explanations. However, once on scene, the 
ambulance cannot reach the injured person as the peloton is arriving: 
neither the vehicle nor first-aiders can cross the road, even from the 
cutting point. The emergency operations commander is worried: “It’s 
the worse situation! The peloton is coming off right now and nothing 
can be done while they run!”. In effect, the first diagnosis is not always 
achieved and the FRD tactical headquarter has not enough information 
to make an appropriate rescue decision. 
15 
 
 
 
At that time, the operational headquarter members meet the FRD 
tactical headquarter truck to get a better understanding of what is going 
on and support the decision-making process. Everybody is under 
pressure and run out of time. The emergency operations commander 
asks to participants to pinpoint the available ambulances on the map in 
order to locate where are the closest ambulances to the accident. In 
doing so, participants mainly direct their attention towards 
transportation means rather than medical expertise. This is what the 
head doctor points out: “Don’t forget medical means! That’s what we 
need for this case, medical capacities to treat the pain first and handle 
the patient!”. The emergency operations commander agrees, suggesting 
sending two medical experts vehicles which come from different 
starting points. However, as the medical vehicles drivers are not 
familiar with the area, the head doctor immediately notices: “Hey wait! 
Two vehicles? It’s too complicated! Who will guide them? Route is quite 
difficult! We are going to lose them in the countryside for sure. We won’t 
get there in time!”. They debate and make the decision to send a single 
medical vehicle, in radio contact with a local firefighter who will guide 
it if needed. In doing so, decision makers agree to adjust their usual way 
of doing: due to the first ambulance inability to get to the victim, they 
cannot follow the firefighters’ “graduated response” procedure, that is 
firstly send first-aiders on scene to establish a first diagnosis and then 
transport the victim to the advanced medical post or to the hospital for 
medical care if necessary.  
Once on site, medical experts (a doctor and a nurse) complete the life 
support checking procedure. Regarding the patient medical condition, 
they request an immediate evacuation to the hospital. In the meantime, 
the peloton passed, and the first ambulance sent on scene crosses the 
road from the cutting point to care for the victim. The usual pattern of 
emergency intervention becomes suitable again.  
The Tribehou action situation 
Tribehou is a small city composed of many hamlets and served by small 
departmental roads. These roads are repeatedly flooded by swamps and 
can become inaccessible for several days. The nearest hospital is at 
20mn of Tribehou.  
July 27, 2016, 12:03 pm. During a medical visit, a general practitioner 
(GP) examines a patient who suffers from chronic diseases requiring 
home treatments (a home care assistant spends several hours per day 
with her). As the medical examination reveals a general health 
deterioration, he calls the emergency number 15. Debating about the 
patient diagnosis during few minutes with the emergency regulation 
doctor, they agree to plan an ambulatory transportation to the nearest 
hospital. The dispatcher then looks for an available ambulance. As the 
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emergency call occurs outside working hours, he first refers to the 
prefectural list of private ambulances being on call. Seemingly, none 
can get on the Tribehou sector in time. The dispatcher then turns 
towards the “Manche” Fire Rescue Department (FRD) with which an 
agreement has been signed to use its ambulance service when private 
services are unavailable. This situation is called “ambulance 
deficiency”.  
The FRD PHE members are individually called via an identifiable 
“beep” that means “private ambulance deficiency”. A “departure 
voucher”, describing information gathered by the dispatcher, is 
automatically delivered to the PHE leader (a professional firefighter). 
He then checks the material, configures the ambulance with regards to 
the patient expected needs and gather his team. The PHE leader is 
assisted by two first-aider volunteer firefighters; he knows them and, as 
he explains, “I know how they work. The division of work is clear 
between us. When we are together, we are able to anticipate what must 
be done and we save time”. The first volunteer is a municipal officer, in 
charge of street cleaning, and the second one is a retirement home care 
assistant.  
Teammates go up into the ambulance. They wonder about the real 
nature of this call that is first identified as a deficiency of private 
ambulance (the typical “beep”) but could be a much more urgent 
assistance requirement. One of the team members agrees: “You know, 
sometimes… it’s a little bit weird as… you can’t be counted on the fact 
that it’s just a problem of unavailability of private ambulance and 
consider that you have time to go on site, and all that stuff… Sometimes, 
it’s a real and serious rescue mission, not just a transportation issue. 
Sometimes, things go really wrong for the patient!”. The PHE leader 
adds: “General health deterioration? It’s very unclear you know, we will 
have to diagnose one on site, to guarantee the best possible action”. On 
the way, team members exchange about previous missions. They 
describe some problems they recently faced with, the solutions they 
found and ask to each other some advices and answers. The PHE leader 
also takes advantage of this time to present the Fire and Rescue Centre 
schedule and activities of the day.  
Once at Tribehou, the ambulance driver asks for the patient’s address. 
Giving it to him, the PHE leader suggests a route that he followed three 
weeks ago during a rescue mission in the same area. The driver makes 
the decision to choose another itinerary as he recently cleaned the 
streets and roads of this area and has a good knowledge of road 
impediments, flooded zones and shortcuts. Once on site, the PHE team 
is welcomed by the patient’s home care assistant. While the two 
volunteer firefighters go near the patient, the PHE leader asks to the 
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care assistant for general information and reads carefully the note left 
by the GP. He then starts to complete a standardized health scorecard 
and monitors his team members during the life support checking 
procedure (complete patient diagnosis). He also asks some questions to 
the care assistant regarding the patient’s medical history, alternating 
between medical and rescue language: “Hemiplegia? Since when? 
What did the doctor tell you exactly? What do you think of her health 
condition today? Have you noticed something unusual? What does it 
mean to you?”. Once the life support checking procedure completed, 
the PHE leader goes back to the ambulance to reach the emergency’s 
regulation doctor by radio. He passes him through information, using 
shared standards of radio communication. The doctor allows the 
transportation to the hospital. The PHE leader doesn’t notice a real 
emergency for this patient case but, as he says: “Anyway, he knows what 
it is, what the situation is. It’s his business as a doctor. And if he has had 
any doubts, he would have asked me thousands of questions!”.  
The PHE leader comes back to the patient house and asks to team 
members to use the stretcher to move the patient into the ambulance, 
following the usual protocol in this case. While driving to the hospital, 
the PHE leader updates the team status, using a transmission housing 
system with which every ambulance is equipped. Status are related to 
the PHE team situation and localization: on the way to the rescue site, 
on site, on transfer to the hospital, on the way back to the rescue centre. 
The language used for up-dating is highly simple and standardized (1 
for on the way to the rescue site, 2 for on site, etc.). The up-dated status 
is automatically delivered to the PHE dispatcher on his tactical screen 
(red when the PHE team is on operation, green when it is available).  
The PHE leader takes advantage of transportation time to review the 
mission with team members. He considers that life support checking 
procedures were necessary to efficiently operate on site, to make sure 
that the patient condition was the same than that expected and to drive 
her towards the appropriated hospital. Even when emergency 
interventions seem easy to handle, unforeseen events may appear and 
create surprise for PHE teams. It’s crucial to remain vigilant to deal with 
the unexpected. The complete patient diagnosis upon arrival is a 
procedure which allows remaining vigilant and attentive to potential 
surprise. As one of team members explains: “There is nothing worse 
than routine. It’s the enemy of the rescuer”. The ambulance driver 
agrees and explains that one of the major issues is lack of information 
regarding the complexity of cases to be treated.  
Once arrived at the hospital, the PHE team brings the patient to the 
emergency triage area while the driver goes back to the ambulance. 
Following specific procedures, he disinfects the ambulance as well as 
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controls and puts tools away so that the team is ready to move again in 
case of emergency. In the meantime, one of the team members remains 
with the patient, making sure she is comfortable, while the PHE leader 
waits for the emergency nurse. A care assistant comes to him to gather 
information required to welcome the patient. She then calls the nurse 
and takes the patient in charge, waiting for the emergency doctor who 
will establish the final diagnosis. 
The two PHE team members meet their colleague to help him with the 
ambulance cleaning. Few minutes later, an emergency nurse runs to 
them, explaining that she didn’t find the time to sign the health 
scorecard and that she comes to do it just before they leave. The PHE 
manager reported very carefully the patient health condition (from the 
medical care at home to her arrival to emergency) in the scorecard. The 
scorecard is systematically reviewed by the chief of PHE staff who uses 
it as a monitoring artefact. It plays a key role to assess PHE teams 
performance.  
Discussion and conclusion 
Our article adopts a polycentric perspective to make visible the 
interconnections between macro-arrangements and coordination 
practices. This polycentric perspective opens a new space to examine 
coordination when extreme action teams report to different decision-
making centres, follow an overarching system of rules, and are 
collectively engaged in the same collective outcome. In the following, 
we advance theoretical contributions on one hand, and practical 
implication both for PHE teams and traditional teams in organisations 
on the other hand. 
Theoretical contributions 
First, our article demonstrates that coordination practices, as manners 
of coordinating and working, are developed when team members 
handle action situations “on the spot”. Coordination practices are 
manifold and are combined by actors according to constraints and 
opportunities they deal with. Our narratives reveal the arrangement of 
three main coordination practices: anticipation, negotiation and 
consensual practices.  
Anticipation practices allow practitioners to make fast decisions and 
work safely. They are mainly based on in-depth knowledge of 
agreements, procedures, artefacts, nature of decision centres and roles 
distribution which provide practitioners with automatisms, that is 
internalized suites of procedures/action structuring actors behaviours. 
Such automatisms support expectancies relevant to tasks, actions and 
needs of teammates or patients without the need for direct or extended 
communication (Rico et al., 2008, p. 165). For example, in the Tribehou 
action situation, the three firefighters (professional and volunteers) 
19 
 
 
 
promptly recognized the typical “beep” for ambulance deficiency and 
shared its significance: they all agreed to consider that the dispatcher 
called them as he could not find an available private ambulance, but 
they also agreed to act as the case to handle was an emergency. In the 
Utah Beach action situation, all the actors first led towards the graduate 
response procedure enforcement, without any discussion in this regard. 
While they were not used to work together and represented different 
authorities and hierarchical levels, they implicitly directed their effort 
toward this procedure enforcement. Debates begun when they realized 
that this procedure was not suited regarding the situation. Extreme team 
members share an implicit representation and understanding of 
situations they deal with. As such, anticipation practices can be viewed 
as a basic component of implicit coordination (e.g. Rico et al., 2008) 
and team cognition constructs such as team mental and team situation 
models (Mohammed et al., 2010).  
The second coordination practice disclosed by our narratives is 
negotiation. Negotiation refers to engaging in arguments for and against 
individual or group positions. Arguments are focused on workability of 
alternative proposals, and disadvantages of these proposals (Putnam, 
1994). Explicit communication is then necessary to exchange and 
collect suitable information relating to and acting upon urgent 
situations. In our cases, we observed that practitioners alternated 
standardized and common languages to communicate. The former is 
related to a technical body of words and numbers (medical and 
emergency terms, status transmission, etc.), whereas the later reflects 
more informal and situated ways of communicating. For example, in 
the Tribehou action situation, when the PHE leader interacted with the 
home care assistant, he used very common terms to gather valuable 
health information: he translated technical medical words into 
comprehensible wording for a non-expert. We specifically observed 
practices of negotiation in the Utah Beach action situation, when the 
operational headquarter members met the FRD tactical headquarter 
truck to help handling the unexpected turn of the situation. Actors took 
time to confront the pros and the cons of arguments based on 
transportation and medical skills. Practices of negotiation are developed 
when adjustments of usual suites of procedures/action (practices of 
anticipation) are not enough by themselves to address unclear or 
unforeseen situations and direct teams toward a relevant solution.  
Finally, the third coordination practice surfaced from our narratives is 
consensus. Consensual practices refer to the achievement of working 
agreement among members (Peters and Pressey, 2016). They agree on 
one or more arguments provided during negotiation and create a 
common view of the way the unexpected must be handled. They 
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develop a shared belief and meaning regarding the process to 
implement and the tasks to perform (Edmondson et al., 2001). The Utah 
Beach situation illustrates this point when PHE members finally agreed 
to send a single medical vehicle, in radio contact with a local firefighter 
who will guide it: practice of consensus led them to elaborate both on 
transportation and medical skills arguments.  
Our article then reveals three main coordination practices extreme 
action teams articulate to seize opportunities and deal with constraints 
in the course of action. The remaining question is then how the broader 
field settings within which these teams are imbedded in is connected to 
coordination practices?  
In paying attention to the overarching of material conditions, rules and 
procedures, our article secondly contributes in disclosing how these 
macro-arrangements enable extreme teams to both structure teamwork 
and dynamically adjust to the unexpected. In effect, macro-
arrangements provide extreme teams with a template for coordinating. 
For example, our cases highlight that all actors, no matter their status, 
hierarchical levels, expertise or institutional affiliation, shared the same 
medical/paramedical general preferences and core values: apply 
knowledge and expertise to practice, put into effect procedures to 
protect patients and improve care, work constructively and rapidly with 
colleagues and show respect for patients are common objectives and 
representations of how the pre-hospital work must be completed. Our 
narratives also illustrated the role played by available technologies and 
artefacts in structuring teamwork. For example, the permanent 
emergency assistance map, showing the established “cutting points”, 
was known, shared and used by PHE members to handle the unforeseen 
situation they faced and find a solution; the transmission housing 
system used by the PHE leader allowed dispatchers to follow mission 
advancement and quickly re-allocate human and transportation 
resources when required; the PHE scorecard aimed at gathering clear 
and accurate records to both guarantee the patient safety and monitor 
team performance. Available technologies and artefacts are 
scrupulously used by team members as they are viewed to support their 
common efforts of coordinating and making decision (Godé and 
Lebraty, 2013). Procedures are also salient in our cases. For example, 
graduate response procedure, ambulance deficiency agreement, first 
distant diagnosis, life support checking procedure, etc. are viewed as 
useful by PHE team members. They are implemented by practitioners 
as their consequences are transparent and they guarantee that the work 
is carried out in an effective way.  
Shared values, procedures, technologies, transportation, codes, maps, 
etc. act as scaffolding (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009, p. 474) in offering 
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a structure enabling extreme action teams to combine anticipation, 
negotiation and consensual practices. We consider that macro-
arrangements shape the routine work of extreme teams in ways that 
enable them to dynamically coordinate their actions, even if they 
deviate from the routine when the situation demands it. The structure 
supports “reworking knowledge to produce a novel action in time to 
meet the requirements of a given situation” (Mendonca et al., 2001) 
when extreme teams are confronted to an unexpected turn of event. It 
creates permanency allowing the development of combinations of 
coordination practices.  
Practical implications  
Finally, our findings suggest some leads for practice, as a polycentric 
view of coordination offers potential for improving performance both 
in PHE teams and traditional teams in organisational settings.  
The multiplicity of local institutional affiliations nurtures high 
performance in PHE team coordination. Repeated horizontal and 
vertical relationships encourage face-to-face discussions and the 
achievement of common understanding. Action situations are 
opportunities for teams to self-organize through informal and direct 
dialogues. Actions situations are temporal spaces, where dynamic 
adjustments are achieved through the combination of anticipation, 
negotiation and consensual coordination practices. For each action 
situation, the structure of macro-arrangements and the dynamic of 
coordination practices generate a pattern of interactions which supports 
direct involvement of teams’ members in completing collective work. 
Consequently, polycentric structures must be promoted by PHE 
authorities instead of monocentric and hierarchical systems (Buttard et 
al., 2012). Although inherent complexity that may be difficult to 
understand and conduct for managers, polycentric structure provide 
more opportunities for PHE teams to manage urgent situations and 
unexpected turn of event.  
However, as shown in the previous section, effective coordination 
between PHE teams is most likely to be achieved if their members 
perceived the usefulness of macro-arrangements. Thus, high managers 
have a key role to play in promoting core values and providing teams 
with material conditions and procedures aligned with teams needs and 
expectations. These macro-arrangements must be considered as useful 
by teams to be implemented.  
Extreme teams may be constantly in a state of problem-solving and 
coordination, which may provide them with an advantage over 
traditional teams in organisations that only occasionally experience 
rapidly changing, risky, and/or uncertain contextual demands. 
However, unexpected events are commonplace in many organisational 
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settings (Bechky and Okhuysen, 2011). As stated by Bell et al. (2018), 
“teams are increasingly being called upon to accomplish critical tasks 
with high consequences of failure that require effective functioning in 
complex, dynamic, and unconventional performance environments” (p. 
2764). As extreme teams, traditional teams work in polycentric settings: 
for example, many stakeholders collaborate in industrial projects, 
business ecosystems or supply chain. Companies are then challenging 
with a multiplicity of decision centres and an overarching system of 
macro-arrangements. A more comprehensive view of the broader 
settings they are involved in may allow for the development of more 
accurate team management processes. It is then important for managers 
to tie teams’ successes and failures to larger organisational contexts. A 
better understanding of micro and macro-connections teams daily work 
with may help strategic managers to design macro-arrangements able 
to provide teams both with a permanent template and spaces for agility 
and flexibility.  
Despite its strengths, our findings also have limitations. Future research 
is needed to determine whether this last practical suggestion is best 
appropriated to certain types of teams or conditions and how to design 
suited macro-arrangements for teamwork in more traditional 
organisation settings. Moreover, our narratives do not enable the 
examination of the way coordination practices could influence changes 
in macro-arrangements. There is a need for longitudinal studies that 
could analyse such effects. Finally, our findings are inextricably tied to 
the pre-hospital emergency setting. In selecting a qualitative approach 
and analysis of our data, our results remain highly situated. Although 
the ethnomethodology investigation refines our understanding of the 
interconnections between macro-arrangements and coordination 
practices, our results cannot be generalized. Future research could 
elaborate on a multiple cases or quantitative analysis to assess our first 
findings relevance.  
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